Governance Center Blog

Jan
01
2012

2011 Top Read Blog Posts

As 2011 comes to a close, we wanted to share with you the five most read blogs from The Governance Center Blog in 2011.  Executive compensation was the big topic of 2011 and we think it will continue to be in 2012 as the focus stays on pay practices in the 2012 proxy. (Don’t miss our upcoming Governance Watch webcast on January 5, which will focus on exec comp and the 2012 proxy.) We think we’ll see more on Dodd-Frank in 2012 as the SEC begins rulemaking. And sustainability will be an increasingly important and public topic for boards. What are you expecting for 2012? Read the rest of this entry »

Jun
08
2010

DI Roundtable Share: Reminders for Directors

In this season of corporate governance conferences, I wanted to use this space to share some information gleaned from a recent Conference Board Directors’ Institute Roundtable held in New York City.

During a luncheon speech given by Justice Carolyn Berger of the Supreme Court of Delaware and Henry Klehm III, a partner with JonesDay, those in attendance at the Harmonie Club in Midtown Manhattan received a dissertation on director Do’s in today’s volatile environment. Klehm read a list of Ten Reminders for Directors, which he said was originally penned by fellow JonesDay partner Pat McCartan.

The list touches on such issues as conflict of interest, committee charters, corporate minutes and director note-taking. For your reading pleasure, the full list appears here or see below.

director top10

Nov
10
2009

Worth Reading…Separation of CEO and Chair

The issue of whether or not to separate the roles of CEO and Chair has certainly stirred lots of conversation in board rooms across the United States, especially as shareholders and Congressmen have called for it in proxies and federal legislation.

The argument made by proponents is that having two separate leadership positions, where chair is independent, is that such a transition is evolutionary for U.S. companies and a best practice around the world. Those opposed argue that there are no proven studies that show separating the two leadership positions leads to better shareholder performance.

The Conference Board Governance Center last week released its first in a series of research digests called Board Book. The first issue’s focus is Board Leadership and CEO/Chair Separation. The publication cites a handful of papers, articles, speeches and research that analyze CEO duality. If you are a Governance Center member, you can access Board Book here (username and password needed).

In addition to the Board Book, I have compiled some more research on the subject:

  • The Value of Independent Directors: Evidence from Sudden Deaths, Bang Dang Nguyen and Kaspar Meisner Nielsen, Chinese University of Hong Kong, May 19, 2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1484707. Key findings: A look at the contributions of U.S. independent directors to shareholder value from 1994-2007. Overall, authors found that independent directors provide a valuable service to shareholders.
  • 2009 Proxy Season Highlights No. 5: Companies With Combined CEO and Chair of the Board Positions, Annalisa Barrett, The Corporate Library, March 23, 2009, www.thecorporatelibrary.com/news_docs/932032509splitceochair.pdf (There may be a fee to download this paper.) Key findings: In a study of more than 3,000 North American companies, TCL found 52 percent combined both positions, 21 percent were led by an independent director and 12 percent have boards led by a former CEO. Companies with dual roles have “troubling” governance characteristics.
  • 2009 Spencer Stuart Board Index, Oct. 26, 2009, http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/lib/SSBI2009.pdf . Key findings: Half of all boards have only one insider, the CEO, up from 44 percent last year. And 37 percent split the chairman and CEO roles, versus 20 percent a decade ago. Of the 184 companies that split the roles, 81 have an independent chair (versus 75 last year) and 91 have a non-independent chair (down from 105 last year).
  • 2009 Postseason Report: A New Voice in Governance: Global Policymakers Shape the Road to Reform, RiskMetrics, Oct. 16, 2009. http://www.riskmetrics.com/docs/2009-postseason-report.
  • Corporate Governance Commentary: Proxy Access Commentary No. 1, The Battle for Shareholder Access — The Current State of Play, Latham & Watkins, May 19, 2009. http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub2633_1.pdf. Key findings: Sen. Charles Schumer of New York proposed a bill that in addition to issuing a shareholder proxy access rule and Say on Pay would call for independent board chairs. At last check, that bill had been referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.
Nov
02
2009

Nasdaq ‘Best Practices’ Proposal May Be Move Toward ‘Comply or Explain’

A combination of new regulations, market listing standards and best practices from a myriad of organizations will make for a patchwork corporate governance model in the United States at a time when simpler is better. That is what U.S. public company boards face in the coming months.

And that raises the question of what U.S. boards will do. Obviously, there really isn’t a simple answer. Now may be the time for U.S. companies to start looking abroad to see what their counterparts in Europe or Australia are doing. (Maybe the NASDAQ market has gotten a head start on this, according to its proposed corporate governance best practices. See below) Our brethren overseas seem to have mechanisms in place that are more open to addressing the corporate governance vulnerabilities than what exist today in the United States.

In many of the European countries, such as the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands, use a “comply or explain” principle where companies that publicly trade sign an agreement to adhere to governance codes that address a number of issues, such as independent chair, shareholder communications and director qualifications. And if they can’t abide by a certain part of that code, the companies must say why.

In the UK, they have had something called the Combined Code since 1992. The Code is essentially a principles-based way to address corporate governance as opposed to a rules-based system, which exists in the United States. So instead of having separate regulations on issues such as remuneration (compensation) committee independence, independent board chair, annual board elections, or independent risk management committees, boards agree to abide by a code that encompasses all of those.

While it may not be perfect, it has improved corporate governance substantially, according to the Financial Reporting Council, a UK regulator whose mission it is to “promote confidence in corporate reporting and governance.” As part of its responsibilities, the FRC revisits the Combined Code’s effectiveness every couple of years. In its March 2009 review, it found that while many financial institutions suffered from governance failures, overall the Code continues to be effective throughout other industries.

There was one observation that stood out in that review: “Market participants have expressed a strong preference for retaining the current approach of ‘soft law’ underpinned by some regulation, rather than moving to one more reliant on legislation and regulation. It is seen as

better able to react to developments in best practice, and because it can take account of the different circumstances in which companies operate it can set higher standards to which they are encouraged to aspire.”

Apparently, the idea of more governance regulation is not too popular. Jon Lukomnik, founder of Sinclair Capital and a member of the International Corporate Governance Network, following a July 15, 2009 ICGN annual meeting in Sydney that “by and large the room rejected more regulation, preferring to use industry pressure to increase shareowner involvements with managements and boards on a voluntary basis.”

But at the same meeting, Stephen Davis, policy director of the Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance at Yale, desperately called for more regulation. “We are in a country that requires people to vote in elections. It is time for governments to step in and require more voting and engagement and mandate reform of fund governance.”

Nasdaq in August did something that might steer the corporate governance discussion toward adopting some kind of “comply or explain” type of policy when it sought comments about adopting Corporate Governance Best Practices. The Nasdaq Listing and Hearing Review Council proposed a list of potential best practice recommendations that members would have to adopt on a “comply or disclose” basis. (See Nasdaq proposal here.)

Some of those best practices include:

  • Executive sessions for independent directors at every board meeting.
  • At those executive sessions, address issues such as tone at the top, use of self-evaluations for the board, whether or not independent directors are adequately involved in agenda setting, and the company’s risk management strategy.
  • Continuing education programs for directors.
  • Limits for directors on the number of outside boards they sit on.
  • Annual director election.
  • Independent board chair and/or independent lead director.

We should know very soon whether or not Nasdaq will adopt these practices since the comment period just expired Oct. 30.

On the other hand, the New York Stock Exchange is amending its listing standards to take care of some bookkeeping to align them with the recent SEC adoption of Item 407 of Regulation S-K, which requires disclosure about director independence and certain other aspects of a company’s corporate governance practices. Nothing is in the offing regarding best practices.

Judging by the reaction of one participant in The Conference Board Governance Center’s Oct. 28 Webcast Pressure Points for Boards: Improving Directors’ Performance in Times of Financial Stress, “comply or explain” might be a tough sell in the U.S.

“There are elements [of governance standards] that we borrow from each other,” Holly Gregory, a partner with Weil, Gotshal & Manges, said. “But there really are some fundamental differences.

“I don’t see us moving toward a European model. Certainly, Say on Pay is something. It is carried out in the UK and Australia is considering it. It remains to be seen if we have similar experiences.” She also cited the U.S. adversarial culture and the difference in the meaning of independent chair as reasons the European model would not work here.

That doesn’t necessarily mean that boards shouldn’t take a hard look at what they are doing across the Atlantic. It’s got to be better than dealing with hodge-podge of regulations that are sure to come.

Oct
23
2009

Update: Feinberg Executive Compensation Report Details

In all the excitement yesterday regarding Treasury Pay Master Kenneth Feinberg’s announcement about the compensation packages at seven of the largest TARP assistance recipients, I wasn’t able to locate his actual determinations. The U.S. Department of the Treasury officially released Feinberg’s report late yesterday following a press conference.

Here are the highlights of Feinberg’s rulings. For the whole press release, click here:

The Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation Issues First Rulings

Today, the Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation Kenneth R. Feinberg released determinations on the compensation packages for the top executives at firms that received exceptional TARP assistance. Under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) as amended in 2009, the Special Master has a mandate to review all forms of compensation for five most senior executive officers and the next 20 most highly compensated employees at the seven firms that received exceptional TARP assistance (AIG, Citigroup, Bank of America, Chrysler, GM, GMAC and Chrysler Financial).

The determinations announced today for the top 25 most highly paid at the seven firms receiving exceptional assistance:

1. Reform Pay Practices for Top Executives to Align Compensation With Long-Term Value Creation and Financial Stability

  • Reject cash bonuses based on short-term performance, as required by statute, in favor of company stock that must be held for the long term
  • Restructure existing cash “guarantees” into stock that must be held for the long term

2.       Significantly Reduces Compensation Across the Board

  • Average cash compensation down by more than 90 percent
  • Approved cash salary limited to $500,000 for more than 90 percent of relevant employees
  • Average total compensation down by more than 50 percent
  • Exceptions where necessary to retain talent and protect taxpayer interests

3.       Require Salaries to Be Paid in Company Stock Held Stock Over the Long Term

  • Stock is immediately vested, requiring executives to invest their own funds alongside taxpayers
  • Stock may only be sold in one-third installments beginning in 2011–or, if earlier, when TARP is repaid–aligning executives’ interests with those of taxpayers

4.       Require Incentive Compensation to be Paid in the Form of Long Term Restricted Stock – and to be Contingent on Performance and on TARP Repayment

  • Require executives to meet goals set in consultation with the Special Master, and certification of achievement of goals by an independent compensation committee
  • Any incentives granted paid only in stock that requires three years of service and can be cashed in only when TARP is repaid

5.       Require Immediate Reform of Practices Not Aligned with Shareholder and Taxpayer Interests

  • Limits “other” compensation and perquisites
  • No further accruals under supplemental executive retirement plans or severance plans
Oct
22
2009

With Executive Compensation Pay Cuts, What’s Next? Say on Pay

Now that the shock of Special Pay Master Kenneth Feinberg’s decision (Reuters, Oct. 22) to cut the pay of 175 executives at companies receiving the most government aid is starting to wear off, the real fun will begin. It’s looking more like Feinberg’s announcement Thursday (Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s comments) is just the first salvo in a fight between shareholders and public company boards.

Actually, another salvo was just thrown by the Federal Reserve today when it issued its long awaited proposal to oversee bank incentive compensation policies. (read the press release)

And the battle cry will be, “Say on Pay!” At least that is what the researchers at The Corporate Library (TCL) and the compensation consultants over at Pearl Meyer & Partners believe. In the same week that Feinberg’s decision was leaked to the press, TCL released a “10-Point Test” for shareholders to use when they are allowed to vote on a non-binding resolution on their company’s executive compensation packages.

Say on Pay Survey

During the recently completed National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) annual Corporate Governance Conference, Pearl Meyer released the results of an online survey (read the press release) on company preparedness for Say on Pay. The survey of 231 participants found that more than two-thirds said their company hasn’t taken any steps to prepare for such a vote and only 35 percent plan to do so in the next six months.

Just look at what they are saying over at Pearl Meyer.“Although many believe such a requirement will not take effect until the 2011 proxy season, decisions being made now regarding 2010 compensation practices could potentially be the subject of Say on Pay votes in 2011,” said Mike Enos, the company’s managing director.

A 10-Point Test

In his “10-Point Test,” Paul Hodgson, senior research associate at TCL, wrote, “More importantly, investors, straining at the leash to have a say on pay, feel that a chance for reform is within their grasp. And not just activist investors. All investment firms are likely soon to have a say on pay, whether they like it or not…”

Some might think it a bit premature to start planning for life with Say on Pay since the Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009, which would require an annual shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation, is not even law yet. As of Oct. 22, that bill had been approved by the U.S. House and still faces a Senate vote. But maybe the Obama Administration is starting to move into high gear on the financial regulatory reform. Case in point: Feinberg’s executive pay cut decision.

Broc Romanek’s TheCorporateCounsel.net blog has one of the best descriptions of Feinberg’s actions. Click here to read.

Principles, principles, principles

I find it interesting that while investors and some companies are gearing up for Say on Pay and the possibility that executive compensation packages will be cut, some are actually trying to get ahead of the reform wave by being proactive. Credit Suisse (Wealth Bulletin, Oct. 21) did just that on Oct. 21 when the Swiss bank adopted the G-20 compensation model that was announced back on Sept. 25. Basically, the bank will focus on higher base pay and more deferred variable compensation tied to the long-term performance of the bank. The bank has also included clawback provisions for bonuses in the new model.

With Credit Suisse’s action, I thought it was a good opportunity to write a list of top executive compensation principles. So below is a table comparing the G-20 principles to that of The Conference Board Task Force on Executive Compensation.

And right here are the principles released by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA):

  • Firms should establish compensation policies consistent with effective risk management
  • Compensation should be linked to sustainable performance
  • Risk management professionals should be appropriately independent
  • Firms should communicate their compensation practices to shareholders.

Executive Compensation Principles

G-20 Summit Financial Stability Board Principles for Sound Compensation Practices
(Released Sept. 25, 2009)

1.) Financial institutions should have an independent board remuneration (compensation) committee that oversees compensation policies.

2.) Compensation should be aligned with long-term value creation by avoiding multi-year guaranteed bonuses and requiring a significant part of variable compensation be deferred, tied to performance and subject to clawback. They should also take into account current and potential risks.

3.) Financial institutions ensure that compensation of senior executives and others who have a material impact on risk exposure align with performance and risk.

4.) Financial institutions disclose compensation policies and structures to guarantee transparency.

5.) Variable compensation be limited as a percentage of total net revenues when it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base.

The Conference Board Task Force on Executive Compensation
(Released Sept. 21, 2009)

1.)  Compensation plans should establish a clear link between pay, strategy and performance.

2.)  Provide compensation that is fair, affordable and clearly aligned with actual performance.

3.)  Eliminate controversial compensation practices that conflict with the notions of fairness and pay for performance – such as excessive golden parachutes, overly generous severance arrangements, gross-ups of parachute payments or perquisites, and golden coffins – unless specific justification exists.

4.)  Demonstrate credible board oversight of executive compensation.

5.)  Foster transparency with respect to compensation practices and appropriate dialogue between boards and shareholders.

Oct
20
2009

Directors Get It: Shareholders Want Independent Board Chair

Like it or not, the wave of corporate governance reform is coming to the U.S. boardrooms quicker than some might like either in the form of successful shareholder proposals, SEC disclosure regulations or federal legislation. And the one getting the most traction lately is mandating an independent board chair.

Nearly one year after the financial crisis flashpoint (the Lehman Brothers failure), shareholders are seeking their pound of flesh by targeting the top executives of public companies. Other than raising their ire over the executive compensation packages (including bonuses), some are looking to change the company governance guidelines regarding company leadership.

RiskMetrics Group’s 2009 Postseason Report: A New Voice in Governance: Global Policymakers Shape the Road to Reform, which was released Oct. 16, found that investors have become more aggressive in seeking governance changes. During the 2009 proxy season, there were 31 proposals calling for an independent board chair vs. 28 in 2008. Also, the amount of support increased 7 percentage points to 36.3 percent from 29.3 percent. Looking back to 2007, that figure was only 25 percent.

On Oct. 9, Norges Investment Bank (registration required) of Norway successfully persuaded Sara Lee Corp.’s board to split the role of chair and CEO once its current chief executive Brenda Barnes’ tenure ends. The company amended its governance rules immediately ahead of its Oct. 29 annual meeting. You can read the amended Sara Lee governance guidelines here. Norges Bank also submitted similar independent chair proxy proposals to the boards of Harris Corp., Clorox Co., Cardinal Health and Parker Hannifin.

And the resolutions kept coming. On Oct. 14, the Nathan Cummings Foundation and the Benedictine Sisters of Mt. Angel, Oregon, announced they filed a shareholder resolution with Goldman Sachs board “urging the board to review pay disparity at the company and analyze the appropriateness of its spiraling pay packages.” In a statement, both investors said other investors would file resolutions for “say on pay” or separation of chair and CEO positions. This all took place as the investment bank announced its annual bonuses would reach a record level in 2009.

And let’s not forget back in March when a UK pension fund asset manager Railpen Investments sought a similar shareholder proposal from Texas Instruments board before its annual meeting.

When you consider that New York Congressman Charles Schumer’s Shareholder Bill of Rights (which is still in committee) has a provision that calls for an independent chair and the SEC has a proposed rule that would seek company disclosure on CEO duality, you can see what I mean by traction. For the first time in years, shareholder groups are working in tandem with government to change company governance rules.

“Shareholders are actually looking for an independent chair, not just separating the Chair and CEO roles,” Catherine Bromilow, partner in PWC’s Corporate Governance Group, said during an Oct. 1 Corporate Board Member Boardroom Channel Webcast. “If we look back about 10 years ago, roughly 80 percent had the two positions combined. Now that figure is about 61 percent. It’s clear companies are considering this issue more.”

After exchanging e-mails with one director this week, I realized that what TK Kerstetter, president and CEO of Board Member, said during his Webcast resonates with the director community: “It’s not about titles, it’s about leadership.”

“I believe that a regulation requiring separation of the CEO and Chair does not fit every board,” C. Warren Neel, executive director of the University of Tennessee’s Corporate Governance Center (he’s also director with Healthways and Saks Inc.), wrote me. “There are a host of differences, one being if the company is run by its founder that will make splitting the roles very difficult. The alternative of a lead director then is what some companies choose for a reason, and find very effective. The right lead director can accomplish the same outcome as splitting the roles of CEO and Chair.”

What TK and Warren said reflects what The Conference Board Governance Center advocates in its just released Corporate Governance Handbook: Legal Standards and Board Practices (Third Edition). “Boards should adopt a structure providing outside directors with the leadership necessary to act independently and perform effectively their oversight role. This structure could include separating the positions of chairman and CEO, creating a lead independent director, or, in the case of a former employee acting as chairman, appointing a presiding director from among the independent directors.”

The Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise (See Corporate Governance Handbook, page 36) in 2003 stated that “where companies have a nonindependent chairman, the lead independent director or the presiding director should have ultimate approval over information flow to the board, meeting agendas and meeting schedules…”

It’s funny how the UK and a good part of Europe are at least a decade ahead of U.S. companies on this issue. Instead of regulations and best practices, they call them Codes.

Oct
15
2009

Directors May Want to Look at That CEO Succession Plan

As investors continue to take aim at public companies and the federal government is ready to ratchet up regulation in the aftermath of the financial crisis, some directors are wondering about their executive team’s future. And that inevitably leads to the question, “How good is our CEO succession plan?”

In the last two weeks alone, there have been at least three high profile “emergency” cases of CEO transitions. Based on the swift action of one of the companies, it seemed that the other two companies did not have an affirmative answer to the above question. Other than internal politics or unique circumstances, it seems one reason for companies lacking good succession plans in today’s environment is that there is no definitive rule by regulators and only one exchange addresses it.

The New York Stock Exchange listing standards require members to have guidelines for the selection of the CEO, the performance review of the executive and the description of a general roadmap to follow in the event of an emergency (including a sudden departure or need for dismissal and the unexpected death, disability or impediment). NASDAQ does not have any rules regarding succession planning.

When Bruce Wasserstein, chair and CEO of venerable financial advisor and asset manager Lazard Ltd., died Wednesday unexpectedly at age 61, the Board of Directors named Vice Chair Steven J. Golub as interim CEO effective immediately. Golub, 63, has been with the firm since 1984 in various senior leadership positions, including CFO and chair of the company’s financial advisory business. As required by NYSE, Lazard has listed its succession plan in its governance guidelines.

In the other two cases (Bank of America and CIT Group), the circumstances involve resignations: Bank of America’s CEO Ken Lewis on Sept. 30 and CIT Group’s Chair and CEO Jeffrey Peek on Tuesday. Both boards weren’t totally surprised considering that Lewis had already been stripped of his chairmanship five months earlier and large number of directors had already been replaced following a divisive annual meeting and Peek is facing the prospect of seeking bankruptcy court protection. Both boards were given a much shorter timeframe to complete the succession plan than most corporate governance experts advise.

Both are prime examples of how two well-known companies, in this case banks, run by CEOs with visions of staying in their positions for the long-term were caught off-guard because they seem to have no discernible succession plan. Both banks failed to name interim replacements as the sitting CEO helps in the search process.

The Conference Board Governance Center’s Executive Action Report The Role of the Board in Turbulent Times CEO Succession Planning (Aug. 2009), points out the importance of directors immersing themselves in the leadership makeup of their company. “… directors should acquire their own personal knowledge of the talent pool available at various levels within the organization and feel confident about the effectiveness of the leadership development program. Considering that the final decision on issues of succession resides with the board as a whole, each director should be able to contribute to the debate his or her informed opinion about the preparedness of internal candidates.”

As for the Bank of America, not only does the board of the country’s largest bank have to name a successor by Dec. 31 (the date Lewis will officially step down), it faces a jury trial with the SEC over an investigation into the nondisclosure of bonuses paid to Merrill Lynch employees prior to the bank’s purchase of Merrill. In addition, the bank faces a separate probe by New York State Attorney General Andrew Cuomo and a House subcommittee.

At the same time, the investor backlash continues as evidenced by this Oct. 6 post by Beth Young, a senior research associate at The Corporate Library. More and more shareholders have been putting forth proposals that address CEO succession plans and even call for management preparing an annual report on such plans. (See Whole Foods Market no-action letter request to the SEC, Oct. 5, 2009.)

The Bank of America board’s six-person search committee headed by Chair Walter Massey now faces the dilemma of elevating insiders such as Chief Risk Officer Greg Curl or Brian Moynihan or going outside the organization and face the possibility of other executives leaving, according to TheStreet.com.. Massey, who faces a mandatory retirement next year, had been “cooking up” succession plans for himself and Lewis back in April, according to TheDeal.com’s Dealscape column in May.

TheStreet.com reports that in August Lewis placed “a number” of key executives in a position “to compete to succeed me at the appropriate time.”

The bank addresses its succession plan policy in its Corporate Governance Guidelines. Its most recent proxy statement (March 2009) lists “creating a succession plan for the position of Chief Executive Officer and reviewing succession plans for other executive officers and senior management” as the board’s third top responsibility.  Additionally, the proxy states that the lead director has the responsibility of discussing succession planning with the CEO. But, unfortunately the lead director resigned in May following a shareholder campaign to remove him.

At the CIT Group, in a prepared statement Tuesday, the company said it is forming a search committee to oversee the recruitment process and ensure a smooth leadership transition at the company.

“Now is the appropriate time to focus on a transition of leadership, and I look forward to working closely with our board during that process,” Peek said.

Most corporate governance experts would beg to differ. They believe succession planning is not meant to be a one-time “emergency-only” task. It should be part of a company’s strategic plan. In The Role of the Board in Turbulent Times, The Conference Board recommends that corporate directors dedicate full attention to their succession planning duties and use the challenges posed by the economic crisis as an opportunity to improve their companies’ leadership development programs.

The report spells out five steps boards should take as a roadmap to help directors organize succession planning, integrate it with existing board responsibilities, make it transparent both within and outside the company and ultimately define it as an ongoing element of business strategy. Those steps are: assign responsibility to a standing board committee of independent directors, make succession planning continuous and integral to business strategy, integrate succession planning into top-executive compensation policy, integrate succession planning into risk management and make succession planning   transparent and describe it the company’s annual disclosure.

Beverly Behan, principal of Board Advisor LLC, believes Bank of America’s board (which had a huge turnover following the annual meeting in May) should have made succession planning a priority over the past four months. “Any succession conversation in the BofA boardroom should have involved a discussion of an interim replacement in a crisis – and an agreement on who that should be,” Behan wrote in her Oct. 6 column The Boardroom on Businessweek.com.

Instead, what she saw there is what she has seen at many public companies. “When I work with boards on CEO succession planning, I am shocked at how often I find that their emergency plan consists of little more than a list of high-potential internal candidates and a telephone tree of “who calls who” if a crisis breaks,” she wrote.

For what it’s worth, I did find a recent example of one company that completed a planned top executive transition that was not precipitated by an emergency. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North Carolina announced it has elevated its COO J. Bradley Wilson to be president while its CEO Bob Greczyn stays on eyeing a possible retirement in 2010. The insurer stated the decision was the result of a year-long succession plan carried out by its board.

Oct
13
2009

Directors, GCs Take Note of New SEC Five-Year Strategic Plan

Directors, general counsel, C-level executives and others involved in corporate governance may want to take note of the SEC’s draft Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2010-2015. For starters, the plan of more than 70 initiatives is a lot more specific and prescriptive for its staff than the previous five-year plan in 2004 and it includes performance metrics to measure the agency’s ability to achieve its four goals.

SEC Five-Year Strategic Plan Draft

SEC Five-Year Strategic Plan Draft

The SEC is planning on issuing investor alerts and other education efforts designed to arm investors in their own first line of defense against fraud and help them understand both intermediaries and new products.

With the SEC under intense scrutiny for lax enforcement during the Bush administration highlighted by the Bernard L. Madoff Ponzi scheme, companies may want to look at Strategic Goal No. 2: Establish an Effective Regulatory Environment. Having already proposed a myriad of governance-related rules and amendments – shareholder proxy access and disclosure regulations regarding compensation policies, company leadership structure and the board’s role in risk management – the SEC under Chairman Mary Schapiro is intent on changing the way it enforces its regulations.

This is the third such five-year plan the SEC has created under the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act. If you wish to comment on the draft five-year plan, the SEC asks that you send letters to strategicplan@sec.gov by Nov. 16.

The SEC spells out its principles for securities regulation: “First, all investors should have equal access to accurate, complete and timely information about the investments they buy, sell and hold. Second, investors should be able to rely upon self-regulatory organizations, broker-dealers, investment advisers, investment companies, and other market participants to conduct investors’ securities transactions efficiently and in the investors’ best interests.”

As part of the effective regulatory environment goal, it plans on achieving three outcomes:

  • The SEC establishes and maintains a regulatory environment that promotes high-quality disclosure, financial reporting, and governance, and prevents abusive practices by registrants, financial intermediaries, and other market participants.
  • The U.S. capital markets operate in a fair, efficient, transparent, and competitive manner, fostering capital formation and useful innovation.
  • The SEC adopts and administers rules and regulations that enable market participants to understand clearly their obligations under the securities laws.

If you were thinking this SEC under Schapiro was not going to take up such  hot button issues like proxy access, risk management disclosure, separation of chair and CEO, executive compensation and international financial reporting standards, forget it.

Just look at what is listed under Outcome 2.1:

  • Improve the quality and usefulness of disclosure – Areas of focus will include disclosure about risk management, executive compensation decisions and practices, nomination of directors, board governance and discussion and analysis of results of operations and financial condition.
  • Strengthen proxy infrastructure.
  • Promote high-quality accounting standards – Support a single set of high-quality global accounting standards and promotion of the ongoing convergence initiatives between the FASB and the IASB.

Among the many metrics the SEC will use to measure its own progress is a survey of financial analysts and institutional investors on the quality of disclosure, the percentage of transaction dollars settled on time each year, the speed of execution of transactions in the securities markets and the length of time to respond to written requests for no-action letters, exemption applications and written interpretive requests.

By the way, the other goals for 2010-2015 plan are:

  • Foster and enforce compliance with the federal securities laws.
  • Facilitate access to the information investors need to make informed investment decisions.
  • Enhance the commission’s performance through effective alignment and management of human, information, and financial capital.

‘Doctrine of no surprises’ Not a Goal this Time

If you want to get an idea how much priorities can change at the SEC in five years, take a look at the last strategic plan in 2004. Look at what Broc Romanek of TheCorporateCounsel.net wrote back then (The SEC’s 5-Year Plan, Aug. 10, 2004). He writes that Chairman William Donaldson touted how the “new Office of Risk Assessment is leading the way to implement the ‘doctrine of no surprises.’” Guess no matter how much you try, they’ll always be surprises.

Oct
09
2009

Institutional Investment Report Finds Investors Want Better Risk Management

The big news coming out of Tuesday’s release of The Conference Board Governance Center’s 2009 Institutional Investment Report: Trends in Asset Allocation and Portfolio Composition was that all major categories of institutional investors have remained fundamentally committed to the same investment policies they adopted prior to the credit crunch. But a key finding under a section on hedge funds and alternative instruments may be prescient for the coming year: investors demand stronger risk management and transparency.

2009 Institutional Investment Report

2009 Institutional Investment Report

As large asset managers were faced with the prospect of dwindling returns in the mainstream equity and bond markets, many turned to alternative investments like hedge funds, according to the report. Additionally, asset managers cited a need to diversify their portfolio and a growing familiarity with such investments.

In a year that saw the largest 200 defined benefit plans total assets decrease substantially to $4.71 trillion in 2008 from $5.60 trillion in 2007, those same plans increased hedge fund investments to $80.6 billion, or 1.7 percent of total assets, from $76.3 billion, or 1.4 percent of total assets, the report says. That section of the report makes a point to state “industry underperformance, coupled with some highly publicized hedge fund debacles, have prompted many boards of trustees to call for more stringent oversight of allocation decisions as well as rigorous due-diligence standards for the screening and selection of alternative investment vehicles.”

The report, which was co-authored by Matteo Tonello, associate director of corporate governance research at The Conference Board, and Stephan Rabimov, economist at the World Lung Foundation as part of the Bloomberg Global Initiative to Reduce Tobacco Use, goes on to state that boards are also calling for robust risk management programs and adherence to additional voluntary reporting.

That’s not to say hedge funds are the only investments that need better oversight. There’s enough blame to go around throughout the whole investment community. That is why organizations like the Investment Company Institute (ICI) is beating the drum for real risk management now. Case in point was ICI President and CEO Paul Schott Stevens’ Sept. 24 speech at the ICI Capital Markets Conference in New York City.

“Clearly, we need to create structures that look across borders, across business lines, and across jurisdictional fiefdoms to anticipate and address serious threats to the stability of the financial system,” Schott said. “No existing regulator has the breadth of vision or detailed knowledge to cope with these complex and multi-faceted risks.” ICI has lobbied Congress to establish a Systemic Risk Council, which would include the SEC, FDIC, Treasury and the Federal Reserve. That council would be responsible for identifying risks and directing regulatory actions. That idea has the endorsement of SEC Chair Mary Schapiro and FDIC Chair Linda Bair, who is credited with coming up with the idea.

The need for risk management information and analytics as it pertains to the investment process is a top priority for institutional investors, according to a survey completed by Northern Trust in July. Ninety percent of respondents rated risk as an “important” or “primary” consideration in their investment decision making. Additionally, many believe they need more skills and experience to effectively model, interpret and utilize the results of sophisticated risk models.

The Conference Board’s Institutional Investment Report documents the presence of different types of institutional investors in single asset classes, such as equity, debt securities, alternative instruments (including hedge funds) and foreign securities. The 2009 edition includes definitive data for 2008 and discusses trends that have emerged in the most recent months.

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