Governance Center Blog

Jan
30
2012

Governance Practices of IPO Companies – Is Carlyle More Mainstream Than You Thought?

A Director Note by Richard Sandler and Elizabeth Weinstein, Davis Polk & Wardell, recently published by The Conference Board examines the corporate governance practices of the top 50 IPO companies from 2009 through August 2011. A copy of the full Director Note is available here. Read the rest of this entry »

Jan
25
2012

M&A Activity in 2012

While we are in a contemplative mood with respect to what may happen in 2012, I turned to the topic of mergers and acquisitions.  Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP recently published an advisory about what boards of directors may face in 2012, and one of the major topics was 2012 mergers and acquisition activity.  Below is an excerpt from the advisory.

M&A in 2012 – Significant Opportunities … and Risks

Read the rest of this entry »

Jan
06
2012

New twist to executive compensation disclosures

The web has been buzzing today about the recent agreement between Verizon Communications Inc. and the SEC. The agreement, detailed in a Wall Street Journal article, lays out the details. In short, Verizon will increase the disclosed pay for former CEO Ivan Seidenberg by $20 Million for 2009 and 2010 due to discretionary grants given to Mr. Seidenberg in 2007 and 2008. But what most people are focused on is on how to read the SEC staff position in a broader sense. Read the rest of this entry »

Jan
03
2012

Governance Watch – The 2012 Proxy Season

On December 16th, as people were preparing to shut down their computers for the holidays, we held a Governance Center webcast to review the key issues affecting 2012 Proxy Season. You can view the recording from that session below. Read the rest of this entry »

Jan
01
2012

2011 Top Read Blog Posts

As 2011 comes to a close, we wanted to share with you the five most read blogs from The Governance Center Blog in 2011.  Executive compensation was the big topic of 2011 and we think it will continue to be in 2012 as the focus stays on pay practices in the 2012 proxy. (Don’t miss our upcoming Governance Watch webcast on January 5, which will focus on exec comp and the 2012 proxy.) We think we’ll see more on Dodd-Frank in 2012 as the SEC begins rulemaking. And sustainability will be an increasingly important and public topic for boards. What are you expecting for 2012? Read the rest of this entry »

Jun
08
2010

DI Roundtable Share: Reminders for Directors

In this season of corporate governance conferences, I wanted to use this space to share some information gleaned from a recent Conference Board Directors’ Institute Roundtable held in New York City.

During a luncheon speech given by Justice Carolyn Berger of the Supreme Court of Delaware and Henry Klehm III, a partner with JonesDay, those in attendance at the Harmonie Club in Midtown Manhattan received a dissertation on director Do’s in today’s volatile environment. Klehm read a list of Ten Reminders for Directors, which he said was originally penned by fellow JonesDay partner Pat McCartan.

The list touches on such issues as conflict of interest, committee charters, corporate minutes and director note-taking. For your reading pleasure, the full list appears here or see below.

director top10

Nov
10
2009

Worth Reading…Separation of CEO and Chair

The issue of whether or not to separate the roles of CEO and Chair has certainly stirred lots of conversation in board rooms across the United States, especially as shareholders and Congressmen have called for it in proxies and federal legislation.

The argument made by proponents is that having two separate leadership positions, where chair is independent, is that such a transition is evolutionary for U.S. companies and a best practice around the world. Those opposed argue that there are no proven studies that show separating the two leadership positions leads to better shareholder performance.

The Conference Board Governance Center last week released its first in a series of research digests called Board Book. The first issue’s focus is Board Leadership and CEO/Chair Separation. The publication cites a handful of papers, articles, speeches and research that analyze CEO duality. If you are a Governance Center member, you can access Board Book here (username and password needed).

In addition to the Board Book, I have compiled some more research on the subject:

  • The Value of Independent Directors: Evidence from Sudden Deaths, Bang Dang Nguyen and Kaspar Meisner Nielsen, Chinese University of Hong Kong, May 19, 2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1484707. Key findings: A look at the contributions of U.S. independent directors to shareholder value from 1994-2007. Overall, authors found that independent directors provide a valuable service to shareholders.
  • 2009 Proxy Season Highlights No. 5: Companies With Combined CEO and Chair of the Board Positions, Annalisa Barrett, The Corporate Library, March 23, 2009, www.thecorporatelibrary.com/news_docs/932032509splitceochair.pdf (There may be a fee to download this paper.) Key findings: In a study of more than 3,000 North American companies, TCL found 52 percent combined both positions, 21 percent were led by an independent director and 12 percent have boards led by a former CEO. Companies with dual roles have “troubling” governance characteristics.
  • 2009 Spencer Stuart Board Index, Oct. 26, 2009, http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/lib/SSBI2009.pdf . Key findings: Half of all boards have only one insider, the CEO, up from 44 percent last year. And 37 percent split the chairman and CEO roles, versus 20 percent a decade ago. Of the 184 companies that split the roles, 81 have an independent chair (versus 75 last year) and 91 have a non-independent chair (down from 105 last year).
  • 2009 Postseason Report: A New Voice in Governance: Global Policymakers Shape the Road to Reform, RiskMetrics, Oct. 16, 2009. http://www.riskmetrics.com/docs/2009-postseason-report.
  • Corporate Governance Commentary: Proxy Access Commentary No. 1, The Battle for Shareholder Access — The Current State of Play, Latham & Watkins, May 19, 2009. http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub2633_1.pdf. Key findings: Sen. Charles Schumer of New York proposed a bill that in addition to issuing a shareholder proxy access rule and Say on Pay would call for independent board chairs. At last check, that bill had been referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.
Nov
02
2009

Nasdaq ‘Best Practices’ Proposal May Be Move Toward ‘Comply or Explain’

A combination of new regulations, market listing standards and best practices from a myriad of organizations will make for a patchwork corporate governance model in the United States at a time when simpler is better. That is what U.S. public company boards face in the coming months.

And that raises the question of what U.S. boards will do. Obviously, there really isn’t a simple answer. Now may be the time for U.S. companies to start looking abroad to see what their counterparts in Europe or Australia are doing. (Maybe the NASDAQ market has gotten a head start on this, according to its proposed corporate governance best practices. See below) Our brethren overseas seem to have mechanisms in place that are more open to addressing the corporate governance vulnerabilities than what exist today in the United States.

In many of the European countries, such as the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands, use a “comply or explain” principle where companies that publicly trade sign an agreement to adhere to governance codes that address a number of issues, such as independent chair, shareholder communications and director qualifications. And if they can’t abide by a certain part of that code, the companies must say why.

In the UK, they have had something called the Combined Code since 1992. The Code is essentially a principles-based way to address corporate governance as opposed to a rules-based system, which exists in the United States. So instead of having separate regulations on issues such as remuneration (compensation) committee independence, independent board chair, annual board elections, or independent risk management committees, boards agree to abide by a code that encompasses all of those.

While it may not be perfect, it has improved corporate governance substantially, according to the Financial Reporting Council, a UK regulator whose mission it is to “promote confidence in corporate reporting and governance.” As part of its responsibilities, the FRC revisits the Combined Code’s effectiveness every couple of years. In its March 2009 review, it found that while many financial institutions suffered from governance failures, overall the Code continues to be effective throughout other industries.

There was one observation that stood out in that review: “Market participants have expressed a strong preference for retaining the current approach of ‘soft law’ underpinned by some regulation, rather than moving to one more reliant on legislation and regulation. It is seen as

better able to react to developments in best practice, and because it can take account of the different circumstances in which companies operate it can set higher standards to which they are encouraged to aspire.”

Apparently, the idea of more governance regulation is not too popular. Jon Lukomnik, founder of Sinclair Capital and a member of the International Corporate Governance Network, following a July 15, 2009 ICGN annual meeting in Sydney that “by and large the room rejected more regulation, preferring to use industry pressure to increase shareowner involvements with managements and boards on a voluntary basis.”

But at the same meeting, Stephen Davis, policy director of the Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance at Yale, desperately called for more regulation. “We are in a country that requires people to vote in elections. It is time for governments to step in and require more voting and engagement and mandate reform of fund governance.”

Nasdaq in August did something that might steer the corporate governance discussion toward adopting some kind of “comply or explain” type of policy when it sought comments about adopting Corporate Governance Best Practices. The Nasdaq Listing and Hearing Review Council proposed a list of potential best practice recommendations that members would have to adopt on a “comply or disclose” basis. (See Nasdaq proposal here.)

Some of those best practices include:

  • Executive sessions for independent directors at every board meeting.
  • At those executive sessions, address issues such as tone at the top, use of self-evaluations for the board, whether or not independent directors are adequately involved in agenda setting, and the company’s risk management strategy.
  • Continuing education programs for directors.
  • Limits for directors on the number of outside boards they sit on.
  • Annual director election.
  • Independent board chair and/or independent lead director.

We should know very soon whether or not Nasdaq will adopt these practices since the comment period just expired Oct. 30.

On the other hand, the New York Stock Exchange is amending its listing standards to take care of some bookkeeping to align them with the recent SEC adoption of Item 407 of Regulation S-K, which requires disclosure about director independence and certain other aspects of a company’s corporate governance practices. Nothing is in the offing regarding best practices.

Judging by the reaction of one participant in The Conference Board Governance Center’s Oct. 28 Webcast Pressure Points for Boards: Improving Directors’ Performance in Times of Financial Stress, “comply or explain” might be a tough sell in the U.S.

“There are elements [of governance standards] that we borrow from each other,” Holly Gregory, a partner with Weil, Gotshal & Manges, said. “But there really are some fundamental differences.

“I don’t see us moving toward a European model. Certainly, Say on Pay is something. It is carried out in the UK and Australia is considering it. It remains to be seen if we have similar experiences.” She also cited the U.S. adversarial culture and the difference in the meaning of independent chair as reasons the European model would not work here.

That doesn’t necessarily mean that boards shouldn’t take a hard look at what they are doing across the Atlantic. It’s got to be better than dealing with hodge-podge of regulations that are sure to come.

Oct
23
2009

Update: Feinberg Executive Compensation Report Details

In all the excitement yesterday regarding Treasury Pay Master Kenneth Feinberg’s announcement about the compensation packages at seven of the largest TARP assistance recipients, I wasn’t able to locate his actual determinations. The U.S. Department of the Treasury officially released Feinberg’s report late yesterday following a press conference.

Here are the highlights of Feinberg’s rulings. For the whole press release, click here:

The Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation Issues First Rulings

Today, the Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation Kenneth R. Feinberg released determinations on the compensation packages for the top executives at firms that received exceptional TARP assistance. Under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) as amended in 2009, the Special Master has a mandate to review all forms of compensation for five most senior executive officers and the next 20 most highly compensated employees at the seven firms that received exceptional TARP assistance (AIG, Citigroup, Bank of America, Chrysler, GM, GMAC and Chrysler Financial).

The determinations announced today for the top 25 most highly paid at the seven firms receiving exceptional assistance:

1. Reform Pay Practices for Top Executives to Align Compensation With Long-Term Value Creation and Financial Stability

  • Reject cash bonuses based on short-term performance, as required by statute, in favor of company stock that must be held for the long term
  • Restructure existing cash “guarantees” into stock that must be held for the long term

2.       Significantly Reduces Compensation Across the Board

  • Average cash compensation down by more than 90 percent
  • Approved cash salary limited to $500,000 for more than 90 percent of relevant employees
  • Average total compensation down by more than 50 percent
  • Exceptions where necessary to retain talent and protect taxpayer interests

3.       Require Salaries to Be Paid in Company Stock Held Stock Over the Long Term

  • Stock is immediately vested, requiring executives to invest their own funds alongside taxpayers
  • Stock may only be sold in one-third installments beginning in 2011–or, if earlier, when TARP is repaid–aligning executives’ interests with those of taxpayers

4.       Require Incentive Compensation to be Paid in the Form of Long Term Restricted Stock – and to be Contingent on Performance and on TARP Repayment

  • Require executives to meet goals set in consultation with the Special Master, and certification of achievement of goals by an independent compensation committee
  • Any incentives granted paid only in stock that requires three years of service and can be cashed in only when TARP is repaid

5.       Require Immediate Reform of Practices Not Aligned with Shareholder and Taxpayer Interests

  • Limits “other” compensation and perquisites
  • No further accruals under supplemental executive retirement plans or severance plans
Oct
22
2009

With Executive Compensation Pay Cuts, What’s Next? Say on Pay

Now that the shock of Special Pay Master Kenneth Feinberg’s decision (Reuters, Oct. 22) to cut the pay of 175 executives at companies receiving the most government aid is starting to wear off, the real fun will begin. It’s looking more like Feinberg’s announcement Thursday (Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s comments) is just the first salvo in a fight between shareholders and public company boards.

Actually, another salvo was just thrown by the Federal Reserve today when it issued its long awaited proposal to oversee bank incentive compensation policies. (read the press release)

And the battle cry will be, “Say on Pay!” At least that is what the researchers at The Corporate Library (TCL) and the compensation consultants over at Pearl Meyer & Partners believe. In the same week that Feinberg’s decision was leaked to the press, TCL released a “10-Point Test” for shareholders to use when they are allowed to vote on a non-binding resolution on their company’s executive compensation packages.

Say on Pay Survey

During the recently completed National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) annual Corporate Governance Conference, Pearl Meyer released the results of an online survey (read the press release) on company preparedness for Say on Pay. The survey of 231 participants found that more than two-thirds said their company hasn’t taken any steps to prepare for such a vote and only 35 percent plan to do so in the next six months.

Just look at what they are saying over at Pearl Meyer.“Although many believe such a requirement will not take effect until the 2011 proxy season, decisions being made now regarding 2010 compensation practices could potentially be the subject of Say on Pay votes in 2011,” said Mike Enos, the company’s managing director.

A 10-Point Test

In his “10-Point Test,” Paul Hodgson, senior research associate at TCL, wrote, “More importantly, investors, straining at the leash to have a say on pay, feel that a chance for reform is within their grasp. And not just activist investors. All investment firms are likely soon to have a say on pay, whether they like it or not…”

Some might think it a bit premature to start planning for life with Say on Pay since the Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009, which would require an annual shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation, is not even law yet. As of Oct. 22, that bill had been approved by the U.S. House and still faces a Senate vote. But maybe the Obama Administration is starting to move into high gear on the financial regulatory reform. Case in point: Feinberg’s executive pay cut decision.

Broc Romanek’s TheCorporateCounsel.net blog has one of the best descriptions of Feinberg’s actions. Click here to read.

Principles, principles, principles

I find it interesting that while investors and some companies are gearing up for Say on Pay and the possibility that executive compensation packages will be cut, some are actually trying to get ahead of the reform wave by being proactive. Credit Suisse (Wealth Bulletin, Oct. 21) did just that on Oct. 21 when the Swiss bank adopted the G-20 compensation model that was announced back on Sept. 25. Basically, the bank will focus on higher base pay and more deferred variable compensation tied to the long-term performance of the bank. The bank has also included clawback provisions for bonuses in the new model.

With Credit Suisse’s action, I thought it was a good opportunity to write a list of top executive compensation principles. So below is a table comparing the G-20 principles to that of The Conference Board Task Force on Executive Compensation.

And right here are the principles released by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA):

  • Firms should establish compensation policies consistent with effective risk management
  • Compensation should be linked to sustainable performance
  • Risk management professionals should be appropriately independent
  • Firms should communicate their compensation practices to shareholders.

Executive Compensation Principles

G-20 Summit Financial Stability Board Principles for Sound Compensation Practices
(Released Sept. 25, 2009)

1.) Financial institutions should have an independent board remuneration (compensation) committee that oversees compensation policies.

2.) Compensation should be aligned with long-term value creation by avoiding multi-year guaranteed bonuses and requiring a significant part of variable compensation be deferred, tied to performance and subject to clawback. They should also take into account current and potential risks.

3.) Financial institutions ensure that compensation of senior executives and others who have a material impact on risk exposure align with performance and risk.

4.) Financial institutions disclose compensation policies and structures to guarantee transparency.

5.) Variable compensation be limited as a percentage of total net revenues when it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base.

The Conference Board Task Force on Executive Compensation
(Released Sept. 21, 2009)

1.)  Compensation plans should establish a clear link between pay, strategy and performance.

2.)  Provide compensation that is fair, affordable and clearly aligned with actual performance.

3.)  Eliminate controversial compensation practices that conflict with the notions of fairness and pay for performance – such as excessive golden parachutes, overly generous severance arrangements, gross-ups of parachute payments or perquisites, and golden coffins – unless specific justification exists.

4.)  Demonstrate credible board oversight of executive compensation.

5.)  Foster transparency with respect to compensation practices and appropriate dialogue between boards and shareholders.

Governance Center Blog