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Economy & Business Environment Blog

May
12
2017

Growth in American manufacturing jobs? It’s happening in Michigan

by Gad Levanon and Diane Lim

Today’s jobs report reinforces the slow yet steady recovery of the auto industry. Since 2009 when auto manufacturing jobs bottomed out at just over 600,000 jobs, the sector has seen steady improvement: back above 900,000 jobs for the past two years and at 946,300 in April, according to today’s report.

Still, U.S. manufacturing and auto manufacturing jobs have yet to reach their pre-recession levels. And as we’ve said in our Hill column before, the recession by no means can serve as the scapegoat for the challenges facing the manufacturing industry.

But for a happy story about manufacturing, look no further than Michigan.

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May
12
2017

Our unemployment rate is great, so why aren’t wages rising faster?

Authored by Gad Levanon and Brian Schaitkin.

Five years ago, an unemployment rate of 4.4 percent — which the latest jobs report shows — would have been unthinkable. The impact of the tighter labor market is noticeable in larger recruiting difficulties and higher quit rates, but so far low unemployment has not been sufficient to deliver the types of wage increases workers crave. Nominal wage growth has remained stubbornly below 3 percent. Adjusting for inflation, real wage growth remains below 1 percent. In fact, the last time workers truly had leverage to enjoy an extended period of real wage growth was during the halcyon days of the dot-com boom.

So what factors are preventing workers from securing wages in an environment that should be favorable to them?

First, worker sentiment indicators suggest that the labor market is as tight as it was at the end of the last expansion, but not tight enough to force more robust wage growth just yet. The “labor market differential” is a valuable measure derived from two questions in the Conference Board’s Consumer Confidence Survey. It is calculated as the difference between the share of respondents who believe jobs are plentiful and those who believe jobs are hard to get. This measure currently sits at a slightly higher level than right before the Great Recession, though still far below record high levels reached in 2000. Should the measure improve further, payrolls may well rise.

Moreover, measures of productivity and inflation also serve as key drivers of wage growth. Since 2005, average productivity growth (the amount produced by a worker per hour) has been considerably slower than during the period between 1997 to 2004. Slower productivity growth means firms are receiving lower returns per worker and therefore are unwilling to pay higher wages. A low inflation environment in recent years has also reduced the need of employers to compensate for increases in the cost of living, which contributed to lower wage growth.

The structure of the labor market has changed dramatically since 2000. More Americans work in these service sector jobs, which also lend themselves to more flexibility for employers in determining business location and tapping into many different pools of workers. With lower union membership rates, service-providing industries can utilize alternative work arrangements more. For example, the rise of contract labor has allowed firms to hire janitors, security guards, and other workers in non-core functions at lower costs. Also, the changing age composition of the labor force has held down wage gains as a large number of experienced and well-paid older workers are retiring.

Finally, it is important to remember that wage growth lags behind a tighter labor market, so the best of times for workers may well lie ahead. Unemployment fell below 5 percent in the middle of 2005, but it was only in the middle of 2007 that real wage growth moved above 1.0 percent. By this standard, faster wage growth could arrive at the end of this year or at the beginning of 2018.

The Atlanta Federal Reserve tracks wages of those who have remained employed for the past 12 months and that measure shows that wages started growing at a more rapid clip almost two years ago. Some of the workers rejoining the ranks of the employed now have spent years away from the labor market and therefore command lower wages, bringing down the overall average. With fewer workers left on the sideline though, employers will have increased difficulty filling vacancies. A seller’s market could well be on the horizon for workers soon, and with that a long sought after raise.

This piece originally appeared in “The Hill.”

Mar
30
2017

3 Things the Jobs Report Doesn’t Tell Us About the US Economy

This blog is authored by Gad Levanon and Diane Lim.

Like every U.S. jobs report, this morning’s report gave an incomplete snapshot of the labor market’s current condition and trajectory.

Make no mistake-the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) report remains the gold standard in terms of being the highest quality, most reliable labor market data out there.

But here are three reasons why this monthly report fails to provide a high-resolution view of the labor market-a view that we economists need to better understand what’s going on.

It doesn’t fully capture unconventional jobs like Uber.

The survey questions fail to fully capture the rising trend of non-standard job arrangements. For example, jobs associated with mobile platforms, like Uber, along with the broader population of the self-employed, including temps and contractors.

These types of work arrangements are not always viewed or counted as employment by either the “worker” or “business” surveys that feed into the BLS report. From the worker’s perspective, a part-time (and often sporadic) activity, even if paid, can be considered more of a hobby or side gig than a “job.”

From the business’s perspective, hiring a “consultant” for specific services is not the same as bringing more employees onto the company payroll. So when the surveys ask workers about their employment situation and ask businesses to “count jobs,” these non-standard work arrangements typically fall under the survey’s radar, and thus don’t get captured in the employment report.

It describes the employment conditions of groups, not individuals.

The report aggregates businesses into industry categories and workers into large demographic categories. Any particular group might show close to zero change in the number of jobs or employment status. For example, in today’s jobs report the manufacturing industry shows a gain of only around 5,000 jobs out of 12.3 million, and the demographic categories of adult men, whites, and those with college degrees each show no change in unemployment rates.

Yet if we could look more closely across different parts of the country, different companies within an industry, and even different occupations within a company, we would likely see plenty of job churning. (In the manufacturing industry, for example, around 275,000 jobs are gained or lost in any month.) And we would likely see changes in the composition of jobs across the narrower categories within the broader ones. Those more micro-level movements would give us much better clues about where the overall labor market and economy as a whole is headed.

It says “a job is a job” rather than identifying “whose” job it is.

Finally, the two separate surveys that feed into the employment report make it difficult to figure out how employment arrangements are distributed across real people. The establishment survey counts jobs as reported by businesses, while the household survey measures employment and unemployment as reported by individuals.

One person can hold multiple jobs, but a job is a job in the establishment survey. Each job in the establishment job count cannot be linked to specific people in the employment status household survey. A person employed in three part-time jobs can be counted as one “full-time” employed person in the household survey (holding multiple jobs), and three jobs in the establishment survey. So more jobs counted from the business side does not always mean “more employment” from the household (real people) perspective.

The monthly employment report falls short in providing the microscopic, high-resolution view of the labor market that economists yearn for. That’s why BLS does so much more, and collects so much more data, than what goes into the monthly employment report-a prime example being their survey of contingent and alternative employment arrangements. They last fielded this survey a dozen years ago in 2005, but have scheduled the next one to be fielded this spring, with the results set to come out in late 2017 or early 2018.

These kinds of supplemental surveys that collect more granular, micro-level information on employment status are essential for economists to have a better understanding of today’s uncertain and ever-changing economic conditions.

This piece originally appeared in “The Hill.”

Mar
30
2017

How The G-20 Leaves Emerging Markets In Limbo

Trade Sentiment Lingers, Emerging Markets Face Headwinds

There is little doubt that anti-trade sentiments are clouding the future of the global economy.

For proof, look at the March G20 meeting in Frankfurt, Germany, which made headlines for excluding anti-protectionism language in its joint declaration. This clearly broke the G20’s tradition of giving a thumbs-up to trade. If public officials backpedal on their commitment to open trade, they will jeopardize prosperity worldwide, especially in emerging markets.

Three things may happen if the anti-trade train continues to gather steam. Every one of them will surely keep business leaders up at night—and not for celebration.

Rising Volatility

While emerging markets are usually volatile, they have enjoyed high growth as global growth and trade expanded. Now, the pro-trade and pro-growth environment that brought sustainable global growth could be giving way to one that is considerably more uncertain as a number of mature economies turn their attention inward. Most emerging market economies depend on demand from these mature economies, so they are especially vulnerable to rising trade protectionism.

Forecasts suggest that 2017 global economic growth could inch up to 2.9 percent – up from 2.6 percent in 2016 and slightly better than earlier projections on the back of better performance from energy-producing emerging economies and some momentum in the US, Europe, and Japan. But uncertainties—including those on the trade front—continue to weigh down growth prospects for emerging economies, especially India, Mexico, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.

On the upside, the US, Europe, and Japan are experiencing stronger internal growth dynamics. Still, this slight boost—even if it fully materializes—will lack the economic punch to ignite emerging markets.

Trade Markets Reshuffled

The evident lack of consensus from the G20’s March meeting on commitment to free trade puts trade-boosting agreements at risk. In particular, there’s America’s marked shift in its trade stance—namely, the death of the Transpacific Partnership (TPP). To make matters worse, little prospect exists for progress on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between Europe and the US. While the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the European Union and Canada passed, if barely, the future of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) moved further into uncertain territory.

How can a reversal of trade fortunes affect emerging economies? Consider Mexico. The US market accounted for more than 80 percent of Mexico’s 2015 exports, according to the World Trade Organization. While that number overstates Mexico’s reliance on the US economy (by also including US imports that are re-exported), Mexico’s reliance on the global economy nonetheless remains intense. Recent Conference Board research using the World Input-Output Database reveals Mexico’s dependence on the global economy has significantly increased in the past two decades. In fact, global demand currently helps to generate close to 20 percent of Mexico’s GDP, a major chunk of it being from the United States.

As the larger trade partner within NAFTA, the share of US demand in Mexico’s GDP that results from demand from abroad is large—about 70 percent on average during the past 15 years. The opposite is not true. Mexico’s economy will suffer both from US trade protectionism and, indirectly, from US-engendered global trade protectionism.

Productivity Puts On The Brakes

Over the next decade, the world economy looks all but certain to putter along. The aging workforce and slowing productivity growth represent structural trends that are nearly impossible to change in the near term. The world economy will find it hard to reach and maintain 3 percent growth. While emerging markets will continue to contribute the lion’s share of global growth, they are not immune to the major trends slowing global growth. Examples are China’s aging workforce and Latin America’s slowing productivity, notably in Brazil.

Emerging markets will grow on average 3.6 percent per year in the next decade, down from 4.1 percent in 2012-2015. For the medium term there are no signs yet that policy changes will alter the trend. On the contrary, signals from the G20 finance ministers’ meeting suggest the opposite.

If the global free-trade agenda gives way to greater protectionism, the repercussions could put emerging economies in limbo. Also, the potential positive effects of trade on productivity and competitiveness recede farther out of reach.

Looking ahead, the outcome of several elections in Europe this year will affect how far anti-trade sentiment will advance. The next G20 summit will take place in July, and it remains to be seen whether this twelfth meeting of G20 leaders will provide more hope for emerging markets instead of more gloom. To a large extent, their prosperity—and that of the entire global economy —depends on it.

This piece originally appeared in “Emerging Market Views.”

Mar
29
2017

Three Trump Actions That Could Rattle Europe’s Economy

While no longer fashionable in the popular discourse, trade has been a key engine of prosperity. Relations across the Atlantic have been solid and deep but recent recommendations from the White House risk souring that economic friendship.

Admittedly, TTIP has never been really popular on both sides of the Atlantic, and the Trump Administration might well put the nail in the coffin. Today, maintaining the status quo looks like the best case scenario as a result of the following three Trump proposals. If they’re enacted, they look all but certain to keep Europe’s business and policymakers up at night.

1. The border adjustment tax

While still under consideration, the proposed border adjustment tax calls for goods and services entering America to face a price adjustment. It would resemble a VAT but a crucial difference is that it would apply only to imports. The Trump Administration and others in Washington suggest the idea as a way of collecting revenue to accommodate for the resulting shortfall from steep tax cuts, and to promote a protectionist agenda focused on “Buy American”.

Moving from a production to a destination-based tax system in the world’s leading economy can have gigantic consequences for business worldwide. Even though economic theory suggests that the tax could be entirely offset by an equivalent appreciation of the dollar, it is difficult to imagine that this happens entirely and fast enough to avoid adaptation measures.

The border adjustment tax could force European companies to cut costs to stay competitive and to reorganise their supply chains to source locally to serve the North American market. While there may be some advantages to that, such as being more environmentally friendly, local sourcing faces constraints of various kinds: availability of natural resources as well as capabilities and know-how that goes into the production of goods and services. As a result of the adjustments that the tax would engineer, business in the US and Europe will face higher costs. That will inevitably translate into higher prices for consumers.

2. TTIP is out; new tariffs may be in

Once upon a time, there were talks to harmonise regulations between America and the EU to strengthen trade and prepare the rules for the 21st century. Now discussions centre on complicating and increasing them. While TTIP remains in a deep freeze, talk of new fines coming out of the Trump White House are alive and well.

If the border adjustment tax does not go through, an increase in tariffs could be the other barrier to trade. One proposal under consideration – as an example – is to slap 100% tariffs on European meats and Vespa scooters. Tariffs would translate into much higher prices for American consumers and higher costs for American companies that use European products as intermediate input. Moreover, they are rarely unilateral: Since the border adjustment tax and ad-hoc tariffs are not compliant with the World Trade Organisation rules, these measures are likely to trigger retaliation.

A trade war would harm Europeans exporters that contribute to a surplus worth €100 billion with the US. This surplus derives from the export of goods divided between 11% of agricultural products and 88% manufacturers in 2016.

3. Corporate tax wars

It may surprise Europeans that the US corporate income tax rate ranks highest among mature economies, at 35%. To put that in perspective, the Finns pay 20%, the French pay 34%, the Irish pay 13%, and the Italians pay 28%. At the same time, revenue from corporate taxes as a percentage of GDP is among the lowest, because of loops in the tax law and profit shifting.

Corporate taxation (a national competence in the EU) is a delicate issue for Europeans – just consider the irritation from the $13 billion fine the Commission issued to Apple in 2016. Well-paid lawyers have engineered dizzying tax arrangements to take advantage of the lack of harmonisation in Europe and the loopholes created by the existence of a single market without a single taxation.

The risk of new tax competition from the US will likely exacerbate this tension among EU member states that use tax rates to compete amongst each other for business. Not only that: it would blow the new attempt by the European Commission to create a common tax base for large companies that operate in the single market (i.e., firms with a global turnover of over €750 million per year).

As a result, trust in the EU is damaged, fueled by eurosceptics who use the case of taxation to argue that the EU serves the purposes of multinationals better than its citizens. In the midst of this eternal contention, proving that large companies are willing to pay their fair share of taxes is left to individual will and stewardship.

This piece originally appeared in “EurActiv.”

Dec
10
2015

Is Cheap Gas Here to Stay? Consumers Think So…

Flash back to the summer of 2014. Sunny skies, warm days, and consumers were paying, on average, $3.70 for a gallon of gas. But an autumn chill brought a rapid decline in the price of a barrel of oil that carried through the winter months. By the winter of 2015, the price of a gallon of gas had fallen considerably and was hovering slightly above $2.00 (Chart 1). Consumers suddenly found themselves with extra cash, and it didn’t take long for the question to emerge: what were they doing with all the “extra” cash?? Would they spend it and help boost consumer spending? Or would they save it, and maybe even use it to help reduce their debt? Could the US economy be the beneficiary of a prolonged period of declining gas prices?

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Aug
17
2015

Does productivity mismeasurement matter?

In recent years, official estimates of labor productivity growth have shown a significant slowdown. But many argue that the government has failed to correctly estimate productivity. This argument was made recently in a Wall Street Journal article featuring Hal Varian, Chief Economist of Google. The piece prompted an elaborate discussion in the blogosphere.[1]

Mismeasurement of productivity likely results from mismeasurement in any of the three components used to construct productivity measures:

  1. The number of actual dollars being exchanged for production
  2. The real value of production, which adjusts the dollars paid for production for price changes and quality improvements
  3. Labor input or number of hours worked, which is used to calculate real value of production per worker or hours of work

Most of the mismeasurement discussion has to do with the second point, the real value of production, and rightly so. Measurement issues with the actual number of dollars being exchanged for production or with labor input do not explain the productivity slowdown.

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Jul
22
2015

Blaming the productivity slowdown on measurement issues takes our eyes off the ball

The productivity slowdown does not result primarily from the mismeasurement of technology output, but from our failure to invest effectively in innovation.

Concerns about a global productivity slowdown are rapidly spreading, as it is increasingly identified as one of the possible causes of the mediocre global growth performance. In a series of reports by The Conference Board we discuss the issues (only for members) and have provided the accompanying measures (publicly available) in detail. A recent report by the OECD is addressing the topic as well.

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Apr
21
2015

Despite Oil Bust, Texans Remain Confident…for Now

Everything is bigger in Texas, the saying goes, and consumer confidence is no exception. Job growth and low unemployment have made Texans far more confident than their fellow Americans for some time. However, the Texas economy is expected to moderate this year, the result of a nearly 50 percent decline in crude oil prices. And while declines at the pump are always welcome news for consumers, this one is a double-edged sword in Texas. On one hand, consumers benefit from the price declines, although most are saving, rather than spending, their newfound discretionary income (see blog: Hit The Road, Jack). On the other hand, Texas’ energy-centric economy and labor market are suffering from the decline in oil prices. This raises the question: will Texas confidence keep booming—or go bust?

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Apr
15
2015

The benefits of lower oil prices are largely behind us, while more risks are ahead

The drastic decline in oil prices that began in summer 2014 has left clear winners and losers among countries, sectors, and industries. Overall, we are not as bullish as some others, such as the IMF in yesterday’s World Economic Outlook , on the aggregate growth impacts on economies around the world. In a new report on oil prices by The Conference Board, we show that (1) the decline’s effect on consumers is largely past, (2) oil producers are still the wild card, and (3) we need to prepare for a long spell of volatility.

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