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Economy & Business Environment Blog

Jun
27
2017

We can turbocharge our technology industry with immigration reform

by Brian Schaitkin and Diane Lim

Today, “tech week” begins at the White House. The five-day confab will reportedly see the likes of technology experts and big-name CEOs like Microsoft’s Satya Nadella, Oracle’s Safra Catz, and Apple’s Tim Cook.

They plan on covering a host of topics, including the elephant in the room: our fundamentally flawed immigration system. Left unaddressed, the issue poses a growing threat to several sectors including tech. For a course correction, it would behoove summit participants to consider a policy blueprint just put forth by the Committee for Economic Development of The Conference Board.

States have vastly different levels of access to foreign-born health care workers
As the report details, under the current immigration system the federal government chooses only a small share of immigrants based on their educational training and work experience. While more than one million immigrants received permanent resident status in 2015, the federal government admitted just 14 percent through employment-based visa programs.

Read the rest of this entry »

May
12
2017

Growth in American manufacturing jobs? It’s happening in Michigan

by Gad Levanon and Diane Lim

Today’s jobs report reinforces the slow yet steady recovery of the auto industry. Since 2009 when auto manufacturing jobs bottomed out at just over 600,000 jobs, the sector has seen steady improvement: back above 900,000 jobs for the past two years and at 946,300 in April, according to today’s report.

Still, U.S. manufacturing and auto manufacturing jobs have yet to reach their pre-recession levels. And as we’ve said in our Hill column before, the recession by no means can serve as the scapegoat for the challenges facing the manufacturing industry.

But for a happy story about manufacturing, look no further than Michigan.

Read the rest of this entry »

May
12
2017

Our unemployment rate is great, so why aren’t wages rising faster?

Authored by Gad Levanon and Brian Schaitkin.

Five years ago, an unemployment rate of 4.4 percent — which the latest jobs report shows — would have been unthinkable. The impact of the tighter labor market is noticeable in larger recruiting difficulties and higher quit rates, but so far low unemployment has not been sufficient to deliver the types of wage increases workers crave. Nominal wage growth has remained stubbornly below 3 percent. Adjusting for inflation, real wage growth remains below 1 percent. In fact, the last time workers truly had leverage to enjoy an extended period of real wage growth was during the halcyon days of the dot-com boom.

So what factors are preventing workers from securing wages in an environment that should be favorable to them?

First, worker sentiment indicators suggest that the labor market is as tight as it was at the end of the last expansion, but not tight enough to force more robust wage growth just yet. The “labor market differential” is a valuable measure derived from two questions in the Conference Board’s Consumer Confidence Survey. It is calculated as the difference between the share of respondents who believe jobs are plentiful and those who believe jobs are hard to get. This measure currently sits at a slightly higher level than right before the Great Recession, though still far below record high levels reached in 2000. Should the measure improve further, payrolls may well rise.

Moreover, measures of productivity and inflation also serve as key drivers of wage growth. Since 2005, average productivity growth (the amount produced by a worker per hour) has been considerably slower than during the period between 1997 to 2004. Slower productivity growth means firms are receiving lower returns per worker and therefore are unwilling to pay higher wages. A low inflation environment in recent years has also reduced the need of employers to compensate for increases in the cost of living, which contributed to lower wage growth.

The structure of the labor market has changed dramatically since 2000. More Americans work in these service sector jobs, which also lend themselves to more flexibility for employers in determining business location and tapping into many different pools of workers. With lower union membership rates, service-providing industries can utilize alternative work arrangements more. For example, the rise of contract labor has allowed firms to hire janitors, security guards, and other workers in non-core functions at lower costs. Also, the changing age composition of the labor force has held down wage gains as a large number of experienced and well-paid older workers are retiring.

Finally, it is important to remember that wage growth lags behind a tighter labor market, so the best of times for workers may well lie ahead. Unemployment fell below 5 percent in the middle of 2005, but it was only in the middle of 2007 that real wage growth moved above 1.0 percent. By this standard, faster wage growth could arrive at the end of this year or at the beginning of 2018.

The Atlanta Federal Reserve tracks wages of those who have remained employed for the past 12 months and that measure shows that wages started growing at a more rapid clip almost two years ago. Some of the workers rejoining the ranks of the employed now have spent years away from the labor market and therefore command lower wages, bringing down the overall average. With fewer workers left on the sideline though, employers will have increased difficulty filling vacancies. A seller’s market could well be on the horizon for workers soon, and with that a long sought after raise.

This piece originally appeared in “The Hill.”

Mar
30
2017

Emerging Markets in 2017: Trends to Watch

Trends Across Emerging Markets: Three To Watch In 2017

Emerging market economies pack a serious economic punch, but will they fire on all cylinders in 2017?

At my research organization, The Conference Board, we project emerging markets to grow at a dismal 3.6% in 2017. Just above half the long-term average growth rate they achieved since 2000. With these economies collectively comprising 55% of the world’s GDP in 2016, how they perform will go a long way in setting the pace at which the global economy grows. Several factors could alter the growth path of emerging markets in 2017 and beyond. Without question, the following three warrant serious attention.

Interest Rates
A hike in the Federal Reserve interest rate will strengthen the US dollar. But as a result, the depreciation in emerging market currencies will make their imports more expensive. Not only will this effect inflation, it also will hamper their ability to produce and export goods, production of which requires imported intermediate goods/raw materials. According to OECD the import content of export – the amount of imported raw material used in the production of exported goods and services – in the seven large emerging economies (i.e. the BRIC plus Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey) spanned from 10 to 30% in 2011.

The rate hike, and the resulting increase in the return over investment in the U.S., will also lead to a return of capital from emerging markets back to the U.S. The lower foreign investment could affect economic growth in countries that rely significantly on foreign investment.

The increasing value of the dollar will affect commodity exporting countries.

If commodities are traded in US dollars, the real revenue earned by these countries will be lower, thus disturbing their balance of payments and ultimately their growth

II. Trade Tumbles

Since the 2000s, a major factor energizing emerging economies has been their integration into the global economy. For them, the door to trade opened wide and fast. Emerging market trade now constitutes more than half of global trade. Nevertheless, global trade growth has nosedived in recent years, particularly after 2011.

Recent research also suggests global import intensity in the post-2000 years was driven strongly by international production fragmentation, which has stalled since 2011. This might reflect the increasing ability of countries to produce upstream products for domestic use or increases in trade restrictions. As such, the growth of trade looks unlikely to increase in the year ahead. Upcoming potential trade restrictions by the U.S will only further slowdown momentum.

Also contributing to the reduction in growth of global trade volume is falling commodity prices.

It constrains the ability of commodity exporting countries to import from economies like China. Within China, the change in the structure of production and consumption favoring less trade-intensive services has reduced its import intensity. Thus, the overall reduction in the import intensity within emerging market economies also has contributed to the trade slowdown.

Lastly, advanced economies face a looming and serious labor shortage problem, which might increase pressure for more automation and digitization of production processes. There is evidence that low-wage jobs are and will remain vulnerable to technological substitution. Given the increasing wage pressure in emerging economies, this might then reduce the off-shoring of low and middle-skill jobs. This would be a secondary effect, and hence will likely hamper future trade growth.

III. Productivity Putters

Labor productivity growth drove the remarkable growth surge in emerging market economies. Yet, most emerging market economies still lag on that front and thus have significant potential to catch up; their relative productivity pales compared to advanced economies.

For instance, today’s labor productivity levels in China and India, respectively, clock in at 1/5th and 1/7th of the United States’. Moreover, these economies have experienced declines in labor productivity growth in recent years. When you consider the likely decline in trade, which I detailed in trend #2, continuation of weak productivity growth looks more and more likely.

For some emerging markets, the chance to catch up in productivity moves farther out of reach by the day.

Consider China. The country is shifting away from an investment-manufacturing-export dependence model to more domestic consumption of goods and e-services. This transition looks all but certain to slow down the brakes.

But in places like China, a return to investment-led growth in productivity is unlikely to push up productivity. To energize and sustain productivity growth, emerging market must look to equipping their populations with new and necessary skills. Many of these economies face severe skill challenges; even more worrying, they continue leaving these challenges on the back burner.

If some emerging markets fail to regain robust productivity growth, they will likely fall into the ‘middle income trap’ phenomenon that has impacted several fast growing Asian economies.

The Bottom Line

The current global environment is not conducive for higher growth in emerging market economies. In the wake of declining global trade, eroding productivity potential, and the foreign investment possibly moving elsewhere, what can help change course? The enactment of policies strengthening domestic demand and easing supply-side bottlenecks would go a long way. Yet that remains a huge challenge.

This piece originally appeared in “Emerging Market Views.”

Mar
30
2017

3 Things the Jobs Report Doesn’t Tell Us About the US Economy

This blog is authored by Gad Levanon and Diane Lim.

Like every U.S. jobs report, this morning’s report gave an incomplete snapshot of the labor market’s current condition and trajectory.

Make no mistake-the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) report remains the gold standard in terms of being the highest quality, most reliable labor market data out there.

But here are three reasons why this monthly report fails to provide a high-resolution view of the labor market-a view that we economists need to better understand what’s going on.

It doesn’t fully capture unconventional jobs like Uber.

The survey questions fail to fully capture the rising trend of non-standard job arrangements. For example, jobs associated with mobile platforms, like Uber, along with the broader population of the self-employed, including temps and contractors.

These types of work arrangements are not always viewed or counted as employment by either the “worker” or “business” surveys that feed into the BLS report. From the worker’s perspective, a part-time (and often sporadic) activity, even if paid, can be considered more of a hobby or side gig than a “job.”

From the business’s perspective, hiring a “consultant” for specific services is not the same as bringing more employees onto the company payroll. So when the surveys ask workers about their employment situation and ask businesses to “count jobs,” these non-standard work arrangements typically fall under the survey’s radar, and thus don’t get captured in the employment report.

It describes the employment conditions of groups, not individuals.

The report aggregates businesses into industry categories and workers into large demographic categories. Any particular group might show close to zero change in the number of jobs or employment status. For example, in today’s jobs report the manufacturing industry shows a gain of only around 5,000 jobs out of 12.3 million, and the demographic categories of adult men, whites, and those with college degrees each show no change in unemployment rates.

Yet if we could look more closely across different parts of the country, different companies within an industry, and even different occupations within a company, we would likely see plenty of job churning. (In the manufacturing industry, for example, around 275,000 jobs are gained or lost in any month.) And we would likely see changes in the composition of jobs across the narrower categories within the broader ones. Those more micro-level movements would give us much better clues about where the overall labor market and economy as a whole is headed.

It says “a job is a job” rather than identifying “whose” job it is.

Finally, the two separate surveys that feed into the employment report make it difficult to figure out how employment arrangements are distributed across real people. The establishment survey counts jobs as reported by businesses, while the household survey measures employment and unemployment as reported by individuals.

One person can hold multiple jobs, but a job is a job in the establishment survey. Each job in the establishment job count cannot be linked to specific people in the employment status household survey. A person employed in three part-time jobs can be counted as one “full-time” employed person in the household survey (holding multiple jobs), and three jobs in the establishment survey. So more jobs counted from the business side does not always mean “more employment” from the household (real people) perspective.

The monthly employment report falls short in providing the microscopic, high-resolution view of the labor market that economists yearn for. That’s why BLS does so much more, and collects so much more data, than what goes into the monthly employment report-a prime example being their survey of contingent and alternative employment arrangements. They last fielded this survey a dozen years ago in 2005, but have scheduled the next one to be fielded this spring, with the results set to come out in late 2017 or early 2018.

These kinds of supplemental surveys that collect more granular, micro-level information on employment status are essential for economists to have a better understanding of today’s uncertain and ever-changing economic conditions.

This piece originally appeared in “The Hill.”

Mar
24
2017

The Real Reasons Behind the Fall in America’s Manufacturing Jobs

This morning’s employment report shows a healthy increase of 235,000 total (nonfarm) jobs last month—pretty much across the board, in all major categories except for retail services. The manufacturing sector alone gained 28,000 jobs—a stronger showing than we’ve seen in a long time.

But we shouldn’t break out the champagne over one month’s worth of manufacturing jobs. Compared with a year ago (February 2016), manufacturing has been essentially flat (up just 7,000 jobs). Looking further back it becomes obvious that manufacturing just has not followed the typical storyline of an industry merely living through and recovering from the Great Recession.

In fact, the saga of manufacturing jobs is not so much about the cyclical recession, but more about more fundamental and longer-term economic trends.

Over the last 10 years, while other sectors have made great strides or at least inched upward, manufacturing has lost over 1.6 million jobs—down from nearly 14 million in February 2007 to 12.4 million in today’s report. Moreover, as a share of total employment, manufacturing jobs comprised just over 10 percent of total nonfarm jobs in February 2007; now, a decade later, they comprise only 8.5 percent.

It doesn’t look likely that once the economy has fully recovered from the recession, that manufacturing will be back to where it was before the recession (in the “old normal”). So what has dealt this more permanent blow to manufacturing?

Believe it or not, it has little if anything to do with public policy. Look to four factors.

First, consumers nowadays increasingly opt for “experiences” rather than “things.” This largely results from the changing demographic composition of American consumers. The rise of retiring, empty-nester Baby Boomers naturally leads to more demand for health care services and tourist destinations. At the other end of the generational spectrum, Millennials can’t live without services like Uber and Netflix; that also means they don’t need their own car or television. A trend away from “things” to “experiences” means jobs in service-providing industries rise (like health care). At the same time, manufacturing jobs in goods-producing industries fall.

Second, there’s automation. With each passing day, companies from a range of sectors use robots to a greater and greater extent. Their capabilities particularly suit them to work alongside or take over the type of work done by manufacturing production workers—tasks that are highly physical, precisely defined, and routinized. And automation will only intensify down the road: a recent McKinsey report determined that about 60 percent of time across all manufacturing jobs is spent performing activities that current technology can automate.

Third, off-shoring production often comes at a cheaper price tag. Locating manufacturing processes in other countries allows companies to leverage the less expensive labor available. Moreover, America’s native-born pipeline of young workers shows no signs of gravitating to the manufacturing sector. Immigrants are not well represented among manufacturing workers either. So we don’t enjoy the benefit of robust supply.

And last but not least, the manufacturing sector as a whole has little worker mobility. During the Great Recession, workers who lost manufacturing jobs disproportionately consisted of middle-aged white men living and working in the Midwest. These workers spent decades at a particular company or in a specific line of manufacturing work. Given their family roots and community ties, they cannot easily move to other parts of the country, where other forms of work (even manufacturing) may be more plentiful.

Mudslinging about which party dealt a blow to manufacturing can make for good politics. But the trends make clear: no public policy could have so much influence as to stop all the fundamental, economic reasons for the industry’s decline. We can’t fight the economic forces driving manufacturing employment, and neither should we try. Such a strategy is inevitably counterproductive. We should focus our public policy efforts on helping those manufacturing workers who got laid off during the Great Recession find a “new normal” – one that maximizes both their desired participation in the labor market and their well-being.

This piece originally appeared in “The Hill.”

Jun
17
2016

Young Brit studying in Belgium? Old Brit retired to France? EU citizen working in the UK? Brexit will harm you.

With only one week to go, the June 23 vote on the UK’s membership of the European Union is important not only for UK citizens and the British economy, but for the entire EU. A Brexit vote will significantly limit the mobility of students, workers, and businesses, whether they reside in the UK or continental Europe. Doing business or simply moving across the English Channel will become far more difficult.

1. Students will pay more. If the “Leaves” win, British students will no longer be able to register for school in Belgium and the Netherlands, where they can earn their degrees for lower fees andavoid student loans. At the same time, European students who dream of a degree from Oxford may lose access to the reduced tuition UK natives pay. The London School of Economics, to name another top UK school, charges 9,000 pounds to Britons and EU students, and almost twice as much to those coming from overseas.

2. Retired workers will pay more. And shiver more. For many of the 700,000 Britons who reside in Spain and 200,000 who reside in France, a “Leave” vote could uproot them from sunny, comfortable, and affordable retirements in southern Europe. The reason: they could lose access to both the healthcare and welfare systems of their adopted homes. Such access issues also apply to Britons are still employed in EU countries. Additionally, there will be an increased administrative burden for their employers.

3. EU workers in the UK might have to go home. The “Leave” campaign is increasingly focused on those who, every year, leave Poland, Italy and Spain to escape unemployment and earn a better wage in London or Edinburgh. There are currently 2.1 million workers in the UK from other EU countries. That number is equivalent to seven percent of the British workforce, with highest concentrations around London—and includes N’Golo Kante, the French star of the Leicester City football team. A Brexit will make them foreign workers overnight, imposing compliance burdens on businesses. The migration observatory at the University of Oxford estimates that in case of Brexit, as many as 70 percent of these workers might not be eligible for the so-called “Tier 2” visa, currently the main visa category for labor migration from outside the EU.

Even British Prime Minister David Cameron, the most prominent campaigner for the “Remains,” has promised to keep net migration from the EU below 100,000 per year. But the “Leave” camp argues that he won’t be able to keep this promise. They may be right. If the UK remains part of the EU, it cannot impose such limits on the mobility of people within the EU.

There are at least two reasons, however, why the status quo—a win for the “Stronger IN”—will ultimately benefit the UK’s economy:

1) Employment rates are higher among EU nationals compared to Britons in the UK

EU nationals who live in the UK have higher employment rates than native Britons: 83.8 versus 78.6 percent, respectively. This is mainly so because EU nationals living in Britain are mostly in the working-age bracket. This also means that proportionally they contribute to the welfare system more than locals. Moreover, EU citizens who work in the UK have very high labor force participation rates, which suggests that a large proportion of these workers is highly skilled.

Ilaira chart 1

Source: Eurostat and The Conference Board

2) The labor market is getting tight in the UK

The unemployment rate in the UK is currently below its long-term rate of 6.3 percent. 4.9 percent is the rate recorded in February 2016. While the joblessness rate drops, job vacancies increase: according to Eurostat (European Labor Force Survey), in the third quarter of 2015 there were 756,000 job vacancies in the UK.

In times of high unemployment one can more easily expect an anti-migration rhetoric to spread easily, but in the current economic circumstances limiting the number of EU nationals will translate into stronger pressure on private sector companies to find talent. When the labor market is tight, companies face problems not only finding, but also retaining their workers.[2]

Ilaria chart 2

Source: Haver Analytics and The Conference Board

 

The combination of an aging population and low and decreasing unemployment makes the risk of labor shortages for the business sector a concrete, and, soon, an urgent issue. This is true not only for the UK but for most European countries where the slow growth of productivity does not compensate for the risk of an aging and shrinking labor force. However, the issue is particularly pressing in the UK and Germany thanks to the vitality of the labor market.

All in all, an analysis of the migration issue that is rooted in data rather than emotions suggests that any limit to the mobility of people and workers within the EU would be detrimental for the British labor market, and for all Europeans with an interest in the UK.

 

[1] Migration Statistics Quarterly Report: May 2016, Office for National Statistics.

[2] See: Help Wanted: What Looming Labor Shortages Mean for Your Business, The Conference Board, April 2016.

 

Aug
17
2015

Does productivity mismeasurement matter?

In recent years, official estimates of labor productivity growth have shown a significant slowdown. But many argue that the government has failed to correctly estimate productivity. This argument was made recently in a Wall Street Journal article featuring Hal Varian, Chief Economist of Google. The piece prompted an elaborate discussion in the blogosphere.[1]

Mismeasurement of productivity likely results from mismeasurement in any of the three components used to construct productivity measures:

  1. The number of actual dollars being exchanged for production
  2. The real value of production, which adjusts the dollars paid for production for price changes and quality improvements
  3. Labor input or number of hours worked, which is used to calculate real value of production per worker or hours of work

Most of the mismeasurement discussion has to do with the second point, the real value of production, and rightly so. Measurement issues with the actual number of dollars being exchanged for production or with labor input do not explain the productivity slowdown.

Read the rest of this entry »

Feb
18
2015

It is not crazy to expect a crazy low unemployment rate in two years

Has the idea of a tight labor market moved from theory to reality? The recent rapid job growth and large drop in the unemployment rate make this question a timely one.

In two years—under reasonable assumptions regarding population growth, labor force participation, and employment growth—how low could the unemployment rate go? The bottom line: We do not need to make crazy assumptions to predict a crazy low unemployment rate in January 2017.

Read the rest of this entry »

Dec
15
2014

Have corporate profits peaked?

Since the beginning of 2009, corporate profits in the United States have been on a growth trend, but this trend may be changing. We see (in Chart 1) that before-tax corporate profits in the third quarter of 2014 are at about the same level as in the third quarter of 2013. After-tax corporate profits are actually lower—and when adjusted for inflation; the comparison is even more negative. This leads us to ask: Have corporate profits peaked for this business cycle? Or is this just a pause in an otherwise ongoing trend of increasing corporate profits? Read the rest of this entry »

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